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The snares of modernity
Internet, information and the SARS crisis in China
Éric Sautedé
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Michael Black
1 The SARS1 crisis has already had a significant impact on China’s economy, politics and
society, and will have an even greater impact in the near future. Without getting into a
debate between poles, whether it was a “Chinese Chernobyl”2 or a “benign crisis”3, the
authorities’ handling of this emergency and the damage this crisis implies now appear
to have  a  potential  for  destabilisation  which  is  likely  to  send  in  a  more  political
direction the great reform project begun 25 years ago. The reason is simple: this crisis
highlights all the contradictions of the Chinese development model, the inequality it
has  generated,  and  the obsolescence  of  a  certain  mode  of  government  which  is
ferociously monopolistic within a context of extraordinary diversification; all this in an
endogenous  manner,  first  in  the  cities,  then  in  the  country,  while  making  China,
although a member of the UN Security Council, if not a “rogue state” at least a state
whose international responsibility is doubtful and apparently impervious to the notion
of “global concern”. At the origin of this lack of responsibility one finds the question of
freedom of information in China, since the pretence of transparency displayed by the
Chinese government since April 20th 2003 only began after six months of mendacity and
dissimulation,  while  official  rhetoric  continued  to  insist  unswervingly  that:  “the
situation is under control”. Without outside pressure, first from Hong Kong’s Chinese
language press and the international press, then from the World Health Organisation
(WHO)—and  only  because  the  crisis  has  taken  a  dramatic  turn  which  was highly
damaging to Hong Kong and then to Peking—, and without the courage of a few Chinese
doctors also, in whose eyes the imperative of public health made this denial of reality
increasingly dangerous, it seems evident that the Chinese Communist Party would not
have been brought around to “communicating”, not to mention giving out information,
as it is doing now. The cardinal role played by the former British colony needs to be
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underlined here: Hong Kong’s misfortune has been the good fortune of the population
of China and of the rest of the world, precisely because freedom of expression there is—
so far—protected.
2 It therefore seems vital to ask ourselves about the inconsistencies of information in
China,  and  particularly  about  the  role  of  modern  means  of  communication  and
information  during  this  crisis,  which,  while  these  have  not  been  totally  absent,
especially the mobile phone, did not fulfil the “alternative” role that they are too often
attributed.
3 While overall this may come as no surprise, it seems useful at this point to remind
ourselves  of  the  politically  restrained  context  in  which  over  60  million  Chinese
internauts  “surf”,  to  think  about  the contradictions  which  arise  between
“communication” and “information”, and to show how highly pragmatic the skill of the
Chinese  government  has  been in  making concessions  towards  liberalisation only  in
those areas where its legitimacy could not be threatened and in misrepresenting its
propaganda by subtle—and modern—artifices.  In the final  analysis,  this  updating of
propaganda is as much a response to the demand for modernity in deception as the
result of the deception of modernity.
Panoptical temptation and interstitial expressions of freedom
4 Information on Chinese Information Superhighway is still tightly controlled4, upstream
by  the  restrictions  imposed  on  providers  and  by  regulations,  and  downstream  by
penalties. This systematic bleeding of the Internet, which at best is “on parole”, largely
explains the medium’s lack of responsiveness to the SARS crisis.
5 Firstly,  on  the  international  connectivity  side,  the  restrictions  imposed  are  both
technical  and  political.  With  some  59.1  million  internauts  and  a  bandwidth  of  9.4
gigabytes per second (gbps) in 20025, China seems to come out well, and growth figures
since 1995 have been considerable. A comparison makes it possible to relativise this
triumphalism about volume. Thus if we take the single example of Taiwan, where there
were “only” 8.6 million internauts in 20026, the bandwidth reached 14.8 gbps7, which
means  that  there  are  almost  seven  times  as  many  internauts  in  China  who  have,
however, only two-thirds the international bandwidth that the Taiwanese enjoy. From
a more qualitative standpoint,  we know, on the basis of scattered information, that
some foreign sites are inaccessible from China. The sites of the big English language
press organs (Washington Post,  Herald Tribune,  CNN, BBC, etc.)  as well  as the sites of
foreign organisations interested in subjects deemed to be politically sensitive—Tibet,
Taiwan, Falungong, Human Rights in China, etc.—are the favoured targets of this denial
of access. The recent study produced by a Harvard Law School research team directed
by Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman8 provides incontrovertible confirmation of
the existence of this practice, since of the 200,000 websites to which they simulated
access  from  China  between  May  and  November  of  2002,  50,000  were  “somehow”
inaccessible  at  least  in  one  instance  and one  locality,  and 19,000  were  inaccessible
several  times  over  while  being  simultaneously  accessible  from  the  United  States.
Besides the sites mentioned above, several content providers linked to education, and
more precisely to the field of health were regularly blocked. This is in particular the
case  of  the  AIDS  Healthcare  Foundation,  Internet  Mental  Health  and  the  research
project Health in China9.
6 The filtering of the data available on the Chinese Internet, both on the web and in news
groups,  is  also  standard  practice  in  China.  All  the  commercial  Chinese  sites  which
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provide news or “spaces for public expression” practice it. Internet cafés themselves
are supposed to install programs which memorise the activity of users, who must first
give proof of identity to the manager of the establishment. The major campaigns to
bring order back to the cyber cafés in the spring of 2001, and in the spring and summer
of 2002 seem to have borne fruit in this area. The filtering methods are well known,
since the technology used was “sold” by big foreign companies such as America’s Cisco
Systems and Global One (a joint venture between Sprint, France Telecom and Deutsche
Telekom), who knowingly dismissed its ultimate application10. The existence of “data
packet sniffers” which make it possible to identify “subversive” foreign sites, of email
filters  and  of  Big  Mamas  on  newsgroups  is  now  largely  recognised,  and  was  even
directly admitted by the Chinese authorities when, in October 2002, Beijing yule xinbao
(Beijing Entertainment News) discussed “leaks” in certain filtering systems11. A recent
investigation by Reporters sans frontières,  carried out with the help of a Chinese BBC
journalist, also showed clearly that the news groups hosted by the big Chinese content
providers—sina.com.cn, sohu.com, yahoo.com.cn and tom.com—were subjected to the
continuous attention of the censors12.
7 Several  forms of  regulatory  restriction make up the  control  mechanism.  These  are
aimed at users as well as at service and content providers. It would take too long to
recapitulate  the  history  of  these  regulations  here,  the  first  of  which  date  back  to
February  1996.  The  most  important  among  them  are:  the  Measures  for  Managing
Internet Information Services issued by the State Council in September 2000, which
make it illegal for content providers—thus making them responsible—to disseminate
information which the government deems to be damaging and “unhealthy”; and the
Regulations for Managing News Services on the Internet,  promulgated in November
2000, which define the content which is forbidden on Chinese news groups and news
sites, and restrains the dissemination of information from foreign media (in short, all
information  which  might  come  into  the  wide  and  ill-defined  category  of  “state
secrets”). Moreover, since December 2000, all deviant uses of the Internet have been
“criminalised”, since they have been made to conform with the articles of the Criminal
Law which deal with “crimes endangering national security”. Other measures with
more  ambiguous  legal  status  are  also  in  force,  such  as  the  Good  Conduct  Charter
imposed, in March 2002, by the Chinese Internet Association on the major news portals
and search engines, which has 130 signatories, including Yahoo! China; or the more
straightforward regulations introduced in November 2002 by the Ministry of Culture to
restrict the operations of Internet cafes13.
8 Lastly,  those  who  breach  these  regulations  face  severe  penalties.  According  to  the
American organisation Digital  Freedom Network, some 34 people have been sent to
prison for “crimes” connected to dissident use of the Internet since January 200014.
While this may not seem to be a large number—the cases are, however, far from having
all been registered and, when freedom is in question, the existence of even a single case
of  restriction deserves  to  be  exposed—,  the  “crimes”  of  which  the  offenders  were
accused reveal the broad-mindedness of the Chinese government when it comes to the
definition of the dissemination of State Secrets and of subversion: detention before trial
and  heavy  sentences  are  applicable  not  only  to  those  who  circulate  Chinese  email
addresses to dissident sites,  to the webmaster of a site deemed to be subversive, to
those who sign online petitions calling for the relaxation of certain restrictions, but
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also  to  anyone  who  makes  public  their  disapproval  when  they  discover  that  an
internaut has been jailed for having signed the petition!
9 The case of Huang Qi, who was arrested on June 3rd 2000, is particularly interesting, and
has just reached its final stage since this webmaster from Chengdu was sentenced in
May 2003, to five years’ imprisonment for subversion. His site, www.6-4tianwang.com
(in reference to the repression on June 4th 1989), was made up of forums searching for
missing persons and, more “serious”, had dared to reproduce articles in Chinese calling
for the revision of the official judgement on the events of May and June 1989. Huang Qi
was charged under articles 103 and 105 of the Criminal Law15, the former aimed at “
whoever organises, plots, or acts […] and instigates to split the country or undermine
national unification”, the latter at “whoever organises, plots, or acts […] and instigates
to subvert the political power of the state and overthrow the socialist system”. While
“organisation, plotting or any other act” are subject to the heaviest sentences (from
three  years  to  life  imprisonment  depending  on  the  degree  of  responsibility),  mere
“instigation” is punishable by a sentence of “a maximum of five years of fixed-term
imprisonment, criminal detention, control, or deprivation of political rights”, except
for “the ringleaders or those whose crimes are serious”, who are liable to a “minimum”
of five years without remission. It seems that Huang Qi was not charged with “acts” of
subversion, but the incitement “by the spreading of rumours and calumny” for which
he was found guilty earned him the maximum sentence for his “virtual crime” in its
least harmful form, or the minimum sentence for it in its most serious form16. There is
little doubt that it is the same article 105 which may be cited when the 107 people
already arrested in 17 provinces for having circulated false rumours about SARS in
telephone messages or on the Internet, are charged17.
10 As we can see, the control architecture of the Internet in China only allows at best
interstitial and temporary freedom of expression. Only the most experienced manage
to circumvent censorship, at the risk of serious consequences. The efficiency of the
control, by regulation and its application, is not merely the expression of real power,
but makes it also possible, in Foucault’s formulation, to take into account the singular
existence of  individuals,  imposing a “continuous and minutely detailed prescriptive
constraint”,  punishing  individual  practice,  so  that  the  censorship  exercised  by  the
public  authorities  brings  in  its  wake  the  other  major  element  in  this  panoptical
perspective :  the  preventive  self-censorship  practised  by  Chinese  commercial
operators…and users.
SMS versus the Internet
11 Overall, the Internet has been subject to the same restrictions as the printed press as
far as SARS is concerned, and compelled to conform to the demands of the propaganda
organs of the Chinese Communist Party. Except for the small window of relative virtual
freedom which appeared between April 4th and 17th, a time of hesitation during which
the new leadership team led by President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao was
preparing  to  launch  its  national  campaign  against  lies  and  the  epidemic,  only  the
circulation of subversive messages by mobile phone, the famous short messages (SMS)
—in  Chinese  xiaolingtong—really  surprised  the  Chinese  government  and  foreign
observers by their volume and independence of tone. Quite naturally, in a context of
total  disinformation  and  because  the  SARS  epidemic  had  as  its  main  centre  first
Guangdong, and then Peking, the volume of text message exchange was particularly
high, since that is where the highest number of mobile phone users is to be found, with
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penetration  rates  (the  number  of  subscribers  as  a  proportion  of  the  population)
exceeding 60%, which is to say close to that of most developed countries.
12 However,  both  the  messages  sent  and  the  nature  of  the  medium  should  make  us
exceedingly cautious about the position of this means of communication when it  is
called on to play a substitute role for which it is not a priori designed. Communication
does not mean information, and while SMS admittedly mould new forms of sociability,
they remain an interpersonal, private means of communication which has unrivalled
advantages of immediacy, of dispersal capacity and of portability. Outside this enlarged
private sphere there is absolutely no hierarchy or intrinsic value in the information.
Evidence of this is that while massive exchanges of SMS in Guangdong18 in February led
to crowds pouncing on Chinese pharmacopoeia and on vinegar to combat the unknown
and non-admittable? illness, they nevertheless did not in themselves lead to national
awareness. As far as content goes, and this proved to be the case once more in Peking in
April, false rumours were much more numerous than true ones, notwithstanding a few
cutting  messages  aimed  at  the  authorities,  most  merely  reported  cases  of  SARS,
whether proven or not. The flight of native or adoptive Pekingers to the countryside
was certainly accelerated by the exchange of SMS, particularly when these announced
that the Chinese army was going to “bombard the capital with insecticide” or that the
government was about to impose martial law, but they did not in any way, for such is
not their purpose, lead to the mobilisation of demonstrators challenging the hierarchs
of  Zhongnanhai  in  the empty streets.  As  for  the degree of  tolerance shown by the
government in the face of these rumours which cause “social disorder”, we can affirm
unquestionably that it is all a question of degree, and once the surprise was over, the
repression was bound to be severe.
13 The other major explanation for the initial relative tolerance of the public authorities
towards the frantic exchange of texts is economic. All the telephone companies—which
are all  state companies—, even the fixed-line operators,  provide such services.  This
needs to be underlined, since the two fixed-line telephone companies, China Telecom
and  China  Netcom,  are  supposed  to  concentrate  exclusively  on  fixed-line
communication and therefore operate in this field in complete illegality since there is
no regulation of text message licences. Nevertheless these two companies, thanks to
SMS,  now account  for  around 6% of  the  mobile  market  in  China19.  SMS and their
income,  while  they  are  modest  and tend to  reduce  prices,  are  now conceived as  a
strategic weapon in a context of fierce competition and price-cutting. While they are
not the ideal antidote to the erosion of revenue per user, they are an indispensable
weapon in the battle for market share: with 95 million SMS exchanged in 2002, income
has increased fourfold compared to 2001, reaching 6 billion yuan20, while in the same
period the number of users grew by 42% (61.4 million new subscribers), overall income
from mobile telephony rose by only 19%, to a total of 192.4 billion yuan, and revenue
per user fell by 19%. The situation is made worse by the fact that users of prepaid cards
now amount to 23% of all  subscribers,  and they are notorious for their shorter call
time21. These SMS resources seem bound to go on growing, since, according to telecom
specialists, the major part of the approximately 200 billion yuan in capital investment
announced by  the  Chinese  operators  in  2003  is  likely  to  go  into  mobile  message
systems22.
14 Once the surprise was over,  the measure taken of  the danger of  the true and false
rumours, and the perspective of a drop in income admitted, the Chinese government
The snares of modernity
China Perspectives, 47 | May-june 2003
5
quickly took the measures necessary to reduce its threshold of tolerance, for although
they were not information, the numerous “rumours” carried by the SMS went against
the new dispensation of a national mobilisation in the fight against SARS. As noted
above,  there have already been more than a hundred arrests directly linked to the
circulation of rumours, and a technician who had worked on setting up a new method
of screening confided that China Mobile and China Unicom singled out subscribers who
sent more than a hundred messages an hour, and that these messages, as well as all
their addressees, could be read by the authorities in less than fifteen minutes23.
The distortions of propaganda
15 With the decision to at last recognise reality, after the special meeting of the Politburo
Standing  Committee  on  April  17th24,  during  which  President  Hu  Jintao  agreed  to
acknowledge that the government had lied and went into reverse to mobilise the Party
in a united front to struggle against the epidemic threatening the capital and the entire
nation,  the  initial  measures  taken  by  the  government  were  energetic.  On  the
communication front, this meant firstly a big press conference organised by the State
Council’s Information Office, during which the deputy Minister for Health Gao Qiang, in
the Minister’s absence, suddenly revised upwards the total of SARS cases (over three
hundred cases in Peking), called the situation “serious and worrying”—to the point of
cancelling the traditional and “golden” week-long May Day holiday—and agreed to give
clear answers to the somewhat embarrassing questions put by the Chinese and foreign
journalists present in the room. Only a few hours later, it was learned that the Minister
for Health, Zhang Wenkang, although close to Jiang Zemin, and the mayor of Peking,
Meng Xuenong, had been sacked from their posts because of their failures in managing
the epidemic.
16 Much more than the meeting on April 17th, inevitably held in camera, it was the press
conference on April 20th which sounded the death knell of the cult of secrecy and of
preventive dissimulation. Can we, for all that, conclude that this is the inauguration of
a new era of transparency? Or on the contrary, are we not merely witnessing a new
dressing-up of propaganda when denial is no longer an option? The April 20th press
conference has been reproduced in its entirety on a number of Chinese websites and all
the  major  portals,  whether  state  (xinhua.net,  people.com.cn)  or  commercial
(sina.com.cn, sohu.com, netease.com), have overflowed, since that day, with extremely
precise information on the illness and on the government’s action to fight against it. All
in all, we have gone from total ignorance in which the ordinary urbanite had heard
rumours on his telephone about the virtues of vinegar in the fight against SARS and for
whom the only alternative was to follow the adage of Galen, the famous first century
Greek anatomist and “leave as soon as possible, go as far away as possible, and come
back as late as possible”,  to a situation of  absolute “information overkill”  in which
anyone with an Internet connection can keep abreast of the latest developments in the
genetic  decoding  of  the  virus,  and  simultaneously  download  the  latest  song
commissioned by the government which proclaims over a rousing tune that victory
over the illness is at hand.
17 What is surely the most convincing example of this modernised propaganda can be
seen on the SARS pages of the Chinese Medical and Biological Information site hosted
by the Institute of Cardiovascular Sciences of Peking University25. This is an extremely
informative  site  containing  the  latest  figures for  SARS  infections  and deaths,  their
distribution by province, the preventive measures to be taken, the latest statements
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from Chinese specialists and political leaders, highly illustrated diagrams on the means
of transmission, sectional drawings of the virus, a number of articles from the Chinese
language press, and even some articles from the foreign press (Washington Post, Reuters,
etc).  Once the  effect  of  surprise  has  passed—the reproduction of  foreign articles  is
forbidden  in  China,  unless  sanctioned  by  the  organs  of  public  security,  and  the
Washington Post  site,  for example,  is  blocked—and one looks more carefully at these
articles, one realises that in reality they are all about technical or scientific aspects of
the epidemic and that the links to be clicked on in order to read the articles are in
reality hosted on the same site, but that, in order to be authentic, the presentation and
the logos have been faithfully reproduced to give the impression that a door to the
outside has been opened…
18 Both  the  efficiency  of  the  methods  of  control  described  above  and  the  know-how
deployed  by  the  Chinese  authorities  on  the  Information  Superhighway  seem  to
contradict any idea of a “revolution of and by information”. They also make obsolete
the somewhat ossified vision of China’s “current generation of Soviet-trained leaders”
being  impervious  to  these  new  means  of  communication  because  they  supposedly
cannot escape “notions of modernity where planning, heavy industry and electricity
represented progress”26.
Modern snares and the delusion of modernity
19 The new and biased excesses of over-communication cannot be allowed to conceal the
sad reality: were it not for the courage of some members of the health profession in the
context of very strong international pressure, the situation of mendacity cultivated by
the Chinese authorities might have continued until the epidemic played itself out—the
optimistic  scenario—or  until  a  burgeoning  health  crisis  appeared  in  the  Chinese
countryside  in  return—the  pessimistic  scenario.  The  question  which  then  arises  is
whether  their  accounts  were  motivated  more  by  generalised  popular  discontent
maintained by modern communication tools—which seems unlikely given the inertia of
disinformation in the weeks which followed the peaking of the infection in Guangdong
in February 2003—or, on the contrary, by their “humanist” duty as health professionals
at a time when the eyes of the rest of the world were riveted on Hong Kong and China,
and when the WHO team present  in  China was  showing great  determination in  its
efforts to unearth the truth—the first recommendation by the WHO to travellers not to
visit Peking was issued on March 27th.
20 Much more than the rumours which circulated among Pekingers or Cantonese, it was
in fact the “free rider” attitude of certain members of the medical profession which
forced the government to open up and reconsider the denial which had been in force
for several months. At the forefront was the retired military doctor Jiang Yanyong,
already known in China and abroad for the positions he had taken in support of the
students who demonstrated in Tiananmen Square in 1989. After the press conference
given on April 3rd by the Minister for Health Zhang Wenkang, according to whom the
situation in China was “safe” and the SARS epidemic “effectively under control”, Jiang
Yanyong sent an email the next day to China’s central television and to the Hong Kong
station Phœnix, in which he accused Zhang of lying and revealed that in the hospitals
he knew in Peking alone, there were at least one hundred cases of SARS and that no
fewer than six people had died of it (as against the 12 cases officially recognised)27. His
email was not initially acted on, but it was transmitted to various foreign press organs
and, on April 8th, his statements were taken up by the German weekly Der Spiegel, and
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on  April  9th appeared  on  the  website  of  the  major  American  weekly  Time.  Jiang
Yanyong’s  statements  then  became  very  popular  in  China  itself,  and  were  widely
distributed by email and posted on the BBS28 of the universities, among them the very
popular BBS Shuimou at Tsinghua University29. This sudden turn of events illustrates
clearly both the potential and the limitations of the use of modern communications
where information is concerned: the information which Jiang Yanyong possessed, and
which he could just  as well  have passed on by telephone or by fax,  was valid only
because it was provided by a respected speaker and, once it had been widely taken up
in  the  foreign  press,  was  transformed  into  news.  There  is  little  doubt  that  the
government’s main worry was that this “free rider” attitude might become widespread,
rather than the contradiction of the official  version expressed on news groups,  the
latter being necessarily limited in scope and only too easily wiped clean.
21 An analysis of the health system in China, particularly in rural areas30, which a number
of studies now deem to be decrepit and highly discriminatory since it charges for its
services, would go beyond the bounds of this article. However it may be useful to look
again at certain data here and place them in a comparative perspective. Thus, if official
figures are to be believed,  in 2001 there were 2.1 million doctors in China,  or,  still
according to official figures, six doctors per 100,000 inhabitants31. These overall figures
include practitioners of traditional medicine and ignore the considerable differences
between town and country, as well as between regions. In France, on January 1st 2002,
there were 237,470 doctors,  or  330 doctors  per  100,000 inhabitants.32 If  we look at
mobile telephony, there were, in 2001, 206 million subscribers to mobile lines in China
and 38.6 million in France. The respective penetration rates were 16% and 64.7%33.
While hasty conclusions are to be avoided, the fact remains, whether those who take an
ordinary view of Chinese modernisation like it or not, that in terms of a highly modern
and profitable “commercial service”, China is in a ratio of 1 to 4 in comparison with a
developed nation such as France. Meanwhile, when it comes to a “basic public service”
the ratio is 1 to 55! There is a remarkable paradox here, when China’s population can
easily  communicate  and  exchange  information  on  the  shortcomings  of  the  public
authorities without ever having the power to follow up the contradiction—there is no
freedom of speech—much less to attempt to change things—there is  no freedom of
association.
22 THE WATCHWORD of the new leadership team, which emerged from the XVIth Congress
of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  in  November  2002,  seems  to  be  to  establish  a
“moderately  prosperous  society”  (xiaokang  shehui),  thus  showing  that  they  want  to
correct disparities of wealth which have become too obvious and find ways to share
growth more fairly. The consequences of the SARS crisis, to which must be added the
unprecedented public admission, on May 1st, that a submarine had sunk with the loss of
70 crew members34,  would seem to show that the regime will  also have to take on
board the demand for “moderately free information”. Nevertheless, there is no doubt
that  the  Chinese  leaders  will  be  keen  to  maintain  a  reduced  conception  of  this
“moderation”, and recent developments on the Chinese Internet indicate very clearly
that Pandora’s Box, contrary to generally accepted ideas, simply remains only “half
open”.
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NOTES
1. SARS : Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome of viral origin which has
aﬀected China in particular since November 2002, and the rest of the
world since last March. In Chinese the name for SARS corresponds
exactly to “atypical pneumonia” : feidianxing feiyan, or feidian for short.
2. Headline on the front of the British weekly The Economist, April 26th
2003.
3. In the words of the mediagenic Chinese economist, Hu Angang, of
Tsinghua University, as they appeared in Wenhuibao, May 11th 2003.
4. For an early analysis which remains valid today, see Emmanuel
Parody and Eric Sautedé, “Internet in China—Roadblocks on the
information highway”, China Perspectives, No. 1, September-October
1995, pp. 36-42. For more recent publications which give a good
overview of methods of control see: Michael S. Chase and James C.
Mulvenon, You’ve Got Dissent! Chinese Dissident Use of the Internet
and Beijing’s Counter-Strategies, Santa Monica, Ca., Rand Corporation,
June 2002; Edward Yung, “Beyond the Great Firewall”, China Economic
Quarterly, October-December 2002, pp. 50-53; Shanti Kalathil and
Taylor C. Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes—The Impact of the
Internet on Authoritarian Rule, Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 2003.
5. http://www.cnnic.net.cn/develst/2003-1e/444.shtml.
6. http://www.dgt.gov.tw/Chinese/Datastatistics/11.3/annual-report-91/
internet-growth.shtml.
7. http://www.ﬁnd.org.tw/0105/howmany/howmany_disp.asp?id=51.
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